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Pennsylvania
Civil Remedies for Sexual Misconduct and the Lack of Civil Pursuit
Published by Philadelphia Lawyer Magazine,
Philadelphia Bar Association
Quarterly Magazine, Spring of 2003
Introduction
Did you know that one in four women in North America were molested
in childhood?
-There are 1.7 million reports of child abuse each year.
-Approximately one in seven males will have been sexually molested
before the age of 18.
-51.9% of U.S. women and 66.4% of U.S. men have been assaulted
by an adult caretaker as a child .
-Most victims of sexual misconduct suffer an identifiable emotional
injury causing ongoing limitations.
-Civil remedies for domestic and sexual misconduct exist where
an accident occurred and negligence exists.
Across America
there exists a judicial trend that favors victims of domestic
and sexual violence. Courts and juries alike, across the country
and in Pennsylvania, are awarding substantial civil damages
to these victims based in negligence. This analysis will focus
largely on Pennsylvania case law. We consider the theory, exception,
damage requirements, and legal outcomes under insurance liability
claims for sexual misconduct in Pennsylvania.
The Theory
Most General
Liability Insurance policies provide coverage for “personal
injury” or “bodily injury” arising out of
an “occurrence”. The term “occurrence”
is defined as “an accident, happening or event . . . (including)
repeated exposure to conditions which . . . results in personal
injury . . . during the policy period.”
A homeowner’s insurance policy covers emotional distress
injuries sustained by a victim sexually or physically abused
under the widely overlooked theory, “negligent Infliction
of emotional distress.” Under this theory, there is a
threshold requirement for each victim to produce substantial
evidence of a physical manifestation of the emotional distress.
Review of Pennsylvania law makes it clear that a plaintiff must
allege physical harm to sustain an action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. The rule can be found in Section 436A
of the Restatement (second) of Torts:
If
the actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance
to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone,
without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is
not liable for such emotional distress.
The
Exceptions
Most General Liability Insurance policies intrinsically exclude
coverage for intentional harm and for claims between named insureds
under the same policy. The exception for claims for intentional
harm is customarily accomplished by definition whereby an “occurrence”
is stated to be an accident, happening or event that is “unexpected
or unintended” by the insured, or by specific exclusion
for intentional acts.
Case law in Pennsylvania supports the exception for intentional
harm, including the leading case of Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company v. Roe, 650 A.2d 94 (Pa. Super 1994). In Aetna v. Roe,
the Court found that there is no negligence, and therefore no
coverage, in a child molestation situation because the molester
is committing a crime and an intentional tort is presumed, which
falls within the exclusion in every homeowner's insurance policy.
The Damage
Current high profile news events like the Catholic Priest sexual
abuse scandals and the corresponding personal injury lawsuits
have reinforced the well known fact amongst health care professionals:
sexual abuse causes severe emotional injury. The multi-million
dollar settlements and verdicts highlight the irony that while
personal injury attorneys scramble to attract the dearth of
lower back injuries, there has been a wealth of the often overlooked
and ignored emotional injury claims stemming from sexual misconduct.
The emotional injury cause of action, negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury cause
of action widely neglected by the legal community although it
has been gaining gradual increased recognition. Rachel Zoll
of the Associated Press reported that at least 300 civil lawsuits
alleging clerical sexual abuse have been filed in 16 states
since January of 2002, when the case of a pedophilic priest
in Boston spurred claims against Roman Catholic dioceses across
the United States.
While the Catholic Priest child molestation scandal demonstrates
the paradigm of an emotional injury lawsuit – a relatively
obvious injury with a clear theory of liability against a wealthy
defendant – there exists a plethora of less obvious lawsuits
with severe emotional injury and an insurable defendant.
Sexual misconduct has devastating consequences that result in
severe damage to the victims and the intimate, emotional relationships
that they develop throughout their lives. Sadly, the victim
often does not seek desperately needed therapy and treatment
because of financial hardship and the lack of health insurance
resulting in an untreated serious health condition and years
of suffering. Fortunately, although it has not been widely explored,
the law has a window of opportunity to compensate the victim
for the pain, suffering, and humiliation caused by such misconduct.
Pennsylvania Law
In fact-specific circumstances, the law in Pennsylvania permits
victims of sexual misconduct to obtain significant monetary
compensation from the homeowner's insurance policy of the guardian
of the plaintiff. Unfortunately, an abuse victim cannot recover
insurance benefits from a lawsuit directly against the molester
because all homeowner's insurance liability policies contain
an exclusion for intentional and criminal acts.
Moreover, a lawsuit directly against the molester is financially
unfeasible due to the unlikelihood of financial recovery and
the lack of available insurance. However, when sexual misconduct
occurs in the custody of a guardian who is responsible for the
safe keeping of the child, and the guardian knows or should
know of the potential for abuse by the molester for whatever
reason, then the victim can often recover insurance benefits
up to the limits of the guardian's homeowner's insurance liability
policy under the "negligent infliction of emotional distress"
theory. General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Allen,
et al, 708 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super 1998).
In many cases, the damaging effect of sexual abuse is so crippling
to a child that the reports of a capable mental health provider
along with a family physician should meet the physical manifestation
of the injury as set forth in Section 436A of the Restatement
(second) of Torts. Logically, if a mental health care professional
opines that a victim needs therapy as a result of a sexual assault
or other domestic abuse, then the "compensable damage"
requirement has been met with the bills for the medical treatment,
counseling, and/or psychotherapy.
Although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is primitive regarding
protecting its victims from sexual misconduct, (whereas New
Jersey is amongst the most victim-friendly), other Pennsylvania
cases have been issued which have wide reaching implications.
In Aetna v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189 (3rd Cir. 1994), the third
Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania Courts would obligate a
college student's parents' home owners' insurance policy to
defend him against a negligence claim filed against him by another
student as a result of sexual relations with her while both
were intoxicated and in his dormitory.
In Aetna v. Barthelemy, a male Penn State University student,
Michael Barthelemy, promised a virgin female student, Ms. McSparran,
that he would give her a compact disc if she drank several shots
of rum. He told her that rum was no more intoxicating than beer
and served her several shots until she became intoxicated and
got sick. The two students then had sexual intercourse.
In McSparran’s Complaint, she alleged battery, negligent
or reckless conduct and negligent or reckless infliction of
emotional distress. In his Answer, Barthelemy alleged that the
sex was consensual. McSparran did not allege that Barthelemy
used force of violence, except for the battery count implications.
Moreover, McSparran asserted in each count that Barthelemy did
not "expect or intend that his conduct would cause the
specific injuries that were suffered by the Plaintiff as a result
of his conduct." The Court determined that the inferred
intent rule to harm under an insurance policy did not apply,
which the Court previously held applicable to an “exceptional
case of sexual child abuse by an insured adult,” Wiley
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 1993).
In finding against the insurance company, the Court stressed
that there was no allegation that a crime was committed. “Just
a tort, not a crime.” The Court distinguished Wiley v.
State Farm, where the insurance company escaped coverage in
the child molestation case based upon the "transferred
intent" doctrine.
The implications of Aetna v. Barthelemy are extensive because
the number of ways that male carelessness results in non-consensual
sexual relations is immeasurable. In addition to Pennsylvania
Court’s willingness to entertain sexual conduct as “negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the Courts also seem to be
willing to expand the circumstances under which an abuse victim
is owed a duty. In Kramer v. Allen, 669 A.2d 360 (Pa.Super 1995),
the Court dismissed a negligence claim against the wife of a
grandfather who molested his own grandchildren while babysitting
for them. The claim was dismissed merely because the Court held
that the wife, who was unrelated to the children, did not have
a special relationship to the children and therefore did not
owe a special duty to the children, but the Court discussed
this principal at length. First, the Court cited Section 315
of the Restatement (second) of Torts:
There
is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special
relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor
or the other which gives to the other a right of protection.
Kramer, 669 A.2d at 362. Because the wife was unrelated, the
Court only considered her duty as a property owner. However,
this case legally implicates any relative who has a special
relationship with the child for negligent supervision, so long
as it can be established that the custodial parent knows or
should have known of the risk of harm.
The opinions of the dissenting and concurring judges also provide
encouragement to those pursuing claims under the negligent infliction
of emotional distress theory. The concurring opinion would remand
the matter for a new trial on the issue of the step-grandmother’s
duty to warn, noting the contempt that society has for a bystander
who does not help an imperiled stranger at little risk to his
or her self. The concurring opinion anticipates that sooner
or later, extreme cases of morally outrageous and indefensible
conduct will change the old law, and this case's fact pattern
is an example. The Court states in its concurring opinion:
Just
because there is no Pennsylvania precedent for imposing any
duty upon [defendant] does not mean that this must be the rule
in this case. The facts of this case strongly implicate "our
ideas of morals and justice" and "the mores of the
community." Appellees, while mere licensees, were children.
They were particularly ill equipped to recognize and deal with
the danger posed by their grandfather. The bizarre details of
[the molester's] pedophilic practices which came out at trial
demonstrate the exceptional magnitude of this danger. Also,
[plaintiff] had first-hand knowledge of her husband's pedophilic
practices. These weighty factors must coalesce into some kind
of duty.
Kramer at
367. The dissent provides even more encouragement for future
claims such as these, and would impose a duty of care against
a property owner based upon the attractive nuisance theory.
The dissent reasoned that since the law imposes an obligation
on a landlord in relation to children irrespective of the trespasser-licensee-invitee
classification in relation to dangerous artificial conditions
of the land, so it should also extend to known dangers of third
persons with vicious propensities. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112
Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). The dissent concluded:
To the extent that the law does not yet impose a duty upon a
possessor of land such as appellant to protect children from
the known harmful acts of known third persons, I would seize
this opportunity to do so ....
Kramer at 371-72.
In addition to the words of empathy in the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Kramer, the Pennsylvania legislature gave victims
advocates something to cheer about last summer. Section 5533(b)
of Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes were amended
to provide a statute of limitations of 12 years from the date
a sexual abuse victim reaches his or her age of majority (18).
SB 212 P.N. 2153 (2002). The new SOL is effective 60 days from
the date of signing which was June 28, 2002
The
Conclusion
The civil law in Pennsylvania with respect to sexual misconduct
claims is evolving. The line of authority outlined here demonstrates
that there are civil remedies for sexual misconduct victims
under negligence theories that are widely overlooked. Society
continues to become more aware of the unpleasant reality of
domestic and sexual misconduct and the Courts seem to be moving
in the right direction.
However, based upon the paucity of authority related to negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the law is primitive in relation
to the prevalence of domestic and sexual misconduct in our society
and the severe damage that the abuse victims suffer.
Personal injury attorneys can participate in the fight against
domestic abuse by remembering the emotional injury causes of
action: negligent infliction of emotional distress in the relation
to the availability of homeowners' insurance. In recognizing
and bringing infliction of emotional distress claims, personal
injury attorneys will assist and protect the most vulnerable
members of society —children and victims of domestic and
sexual misconduct.
G.
Lawrence DeMarco
©
2006 G. Lawrence DeMarco
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